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THE TRINITY AND EXTENDED SIMPLES
Martin Pickup
In this paper, I will offer an analogy between the Trinity and extended 
simples that supports a Latin approach to the Trinity. The theoretical tools 
developed to discuss and debate extended simples in the literature of con-
temporary analytic metaphysics, I argue, can help us make useful conceptual 
distinctions in attempts to understand what it could be for God to be Triune. 
Furthermore, the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity might 
surprise some who find one of these at least plausibly possible and the other 
incoherent.
In this paper, I will offer an analogy between the Trinity and extended 
simples. In doing so, I hope to shed some light on the philosophical prob-
lems of Trinitarian doctrine and suggest a tentative way to address the core 
of them. The theoretical tools developed to discuss and debate extended 
simples in the literature of contemporary analytic metaphysics, I argue, 
can help us make useful conceptual distinctions in attempts to understand 
what it could be for God to be Triune. Furthermore, the analogy between 
extended simples and the Trinity might surprise some who find one of 
these at least plausibly possible and the other incoherent.
In order to show connections between these seemingly disparate topics, 
I shall first briefly introduce the notion of extended simples before, in the 
next section, outlining the core contemporary philosophical problem of 
the Trinity. In the later parts of the paper, I’ll then apply the conceptual 
resources provided by extended simples to the specified Trinitarian 
problem.
Extended simples, as might be expected, are entities that are both ex-
tended and simple. They are extended in the sense of occupying regions of 
space and they are simple in the sense of having no parts. So, to speak more 
colloquially, extended simples are objects which are spread out in space 
but which do not have any bits to them.1
1I will speak of space rather than spacetime in what follows, though everything I will 
say is translatable into spacetime terminology. I do so simply to avoid complications (espe-
cially regarding the relationship between the temporal axis of spacetime (in a given reference 
frame) and time itself).
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Extended simples would be strange, and there is a discussion in the 
metaphysics literature about whether or not they are possible. For how 
can something that is extended not be made up of parts? Even proponents 
of the possibility of extended simples will admit that this is strange. The 
strangeness comes from the fact that the parthood relations are different 
for the entity and its location: the simple entity has no parts but the region 
the extended object occupies does have parts.2 Thus, the mereological struc-
ture of extended simples comes apart from the mereological structure of 
the spatial regions they occupy. I submit that this is the source of (at least 
some of) the strangeness of extended simples; a dissonance introduced by 
the structural difference between entities and their locations.
Defenders of the possibility of extended simples point out that just 
because this is strange doesn’t make it impossible, and that there is no ob-
vious contradiction in the notion of something occupying complex spatial 
regions but having no parts. In other words, these metaphysicians claim 
that for at least some possible objects, their mereological structure and 
the structure of their location are not aligned.3 The possibility of extended 
simples would therefore demonstrate that the mereological structures of 
these two are at least logically independent. It is this distinction, between 
the structures of entities and of their locations, that I want to exploit in 
presenting an analogy between extended simples and the doctrine of the 
Trinity. But before discussing the analogy, we should set out clearly the 
problem to address.
1. The Problem of the Trinity
The doctrine of the Trinity is a claim about what God is. It is a claim that 
God is, in some sense, three, and, in some sense, one. It is a doctrine with 
a long and intricate history. The scriptural evidence, the early church 
discussions, and later debates have all contributed to the doctrine. It is 
contentious how, precisely, we should understand it. Nevertheless, in con-
temporary philosophical discussion of the doctrine, we can identify a core 
question: how can God be both three and one?
Any account of the Trinity faces this difficulty. To give an example of a 
text that gives rise to these worries, consider part of the Athanasian Creed:
[W]e worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; Neither confounding 
the Persons: nor dividing the Substance. For there is one Person of the Father, 
2This characterisation might be resisted if we can make sense of a region of space that 
does not contain parts. If so, an entity could be extended in virtue of occupying a region 
without thereby having a mereologically complex location. But it is natural to characterise 
regions in mereological terms, whereby a region is mereologically complex and contains 
points of space as parts. So an alternative, non-mereological account of what it is to be a 
region would need to be provided before we can develop this thought further. Thanks to 
Mark Murphy for noticing this.
3Some objects may inherit their structure from their location, and vice versa. Such objects 
necessarily have the same structure as their locations. The claim here is that not all objects 
and their locations are like this. (See Saucedo, “Parthood and Location,” for a discussion of 
various ways that objects and their locations can fail to align.)
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another of the Son: and another of the Holy Ghost . . . So the Father is God, 
the Son is God: and the Holy Ghost is God.4
A prima facie reading of Athanasian text would propose that each of the 
Father, Son and Spirit are God, but that they are distinct. It is this conten-
tion that is the typical starting point for the contemporary philosophical 
discussion.5 Of course, there is a good doctrinal question about whether 
this is the right way to understand the various creedal claims, but this is not 
one I’ll consider here. Rather, I want to see whether extended simples can 
help with what we might call the “philosophers’” problem of the Trinity.
So, what is this problem? Well, a straightforward way of understanding 
that the Father, Son and Spirit are God but that they are distinct is that:
(1) The Father is God
(2) The Son is God
(3) The Holy Spirit is God
And also that:
(4) The Father is not the Son
(5) The Father is not the Holy Spirit
(6) The Son is not the Holy Spirit
The problem is that, if we read the “is” in each case as an “is” of identity, 
we have the resulting claims (where F, S, H and G abbreviate their obvious 
candidates):
(7) F = G
(8) S = G
(9) H = G
(10) F ≠ S
(11) F ≠ H
(12) S ≠ H
But by the transitivity and symmetry of identity,
(13) F = S
(14) F = H
(15) S = H
4This is the Book of Common Prayer’s translation. Note that Eastern Church Christians 
don’t typically accept the Athanasian Creed, but the core problem I identify is shared never-
theless.
5Michael Rea, in his chapter “The Trinity,” 403–404 states that this is called the “the logical 
problem of the Trinity” by philosophers and “the threeness-oneness problem” by theolo-
gians. As a couple of examples, the problem is set out this way by Kleinschmidt, “Many-One 
Identity and the Trinity,” and by Howard-Snyder, in his introductory entry “Trinity.”
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Any of these three provides a contradiction with one of (10) – (12). This is 
the core contemporary philosophical problem.6
One solution to this problem is to toy with identity so that a contradic-
tion cannot be derived from (7) – (12). An obvious way of doing so is to 
deny either the transitivity or the symmetry of identity. But this is mas-
sively controversial: any relation that is not both transitive and symmetric 
doesn’t seem to be identity. Another suggestion along these lines is the 
relative identity view, according to which we should understand identity as 
(in at least some cases) being with respect to a particular sortal.7 According 
to such a view, (7) – (12) are incomplete because they do not specify the 
sortal under which the terms fall. A relative identity theorist might there-
fore hope that holding the sortal terms fixed avoids a contradiction. I don’t 
favour a relative identity view: any sort of adjustments to or complica-
tions of identity are liable to serious objection. But I will not here try to 
substantiate such objections. Instead, for reasons of space, I’ll simply set 
this alternative aside.
If we accept the canonical account of identity, then, (7) – (12) does in-
deed lead to contradiction. We must therefore find a reason to deny that 
all of (7) – (12) are the appropriate translations of (1) – (6). But then the task 
is to say which are inappropriate and why, whilst maintaining a view that 
can faithfully be called Trinitarian.
There are two broad approaches to this. The first takes (7) – (9) to be 
inappropriate translations of (1) – (3) and the second takes (10) – (12) to be 
inappropriate translations of (4) – (6). The first approach emphasises the 
distinctness of the Persons, the second approach emphasises the unity of 
God. These two different ways of proceeding are sometimes called the 
Greek and Latin approaches to the Trinity, respectively (though the his-
torical aptness of these designations is not certain8). This paper will take 
the second way, that of trying to account for the distinctness of the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit without translating this into the definitive denial of 
numerical identity. The reason I do so is simply that I find the criticisms 
of the Greek approach convincing.9 But I do not have space to argue this 
here. Thus, I will be exploring a Latin Trinitarian view, as advocated in 
this journal and elsewhere by Brian Leftow.10 The paper can therefore be 
6By this, I do not mean to suggest that it is the most important or difficult problem associ-
ated with the Trinity, but rather that it is in some sense the most primitive: if we can’t fix this 
problem there’s just a contradiction being expressed.
7For discussion, see Rea, “Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity.” A sortal is a 
kind term for some countable kind. “Chicken,” “statue,” and “molecule” are examples of 
sortals.
8See Cross, “Latin Trinitarianism: Some Conceptual and Historical Considerations” for a 
discussion of this.
9There is much written both in favour of and against the Greek or “social” account of 
the Trinity. The McCall and Rea collection, Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity, 
especially Part 1, is a good place to begin, and William Hasker’s recent book length treatment 
in his Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God is a prominent defence.
10Leftow, “A Latin Trinity.”
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seen as a way of spelling out the Latin approach, and suggesting reasons 
to think it plausible. The comparative task of assessing the costs and ben-
efits of the Latin approach versus the alternatives will have to wait for 
another day.
As I am taking a Latin view, I will be examining the translatability of 
(4) – (6) into (10) – (12). I will deny that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are 
numerically distinct entities. But this seems to spell trouble: the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit are supposed to be persons, and different persons. 
How can this be compatible with them not being numerically distinct 
entities? We need to find a way to model the fact that they are numerical 
identical as God, but still hold onto some version of the assertion that they 
are distinct persons. It is here that I believe the analogy with extended 
simples can help us.
2. The Analogy between Extended Simples and the Trinity
Recall that in the case of extended simples, the structure of space and 
the structure of the entity come apart. With this in mind, my core claim 
can now be stated rather briefly: in the divine the “substance-structure” 
described by the statements of identity above, (1) – (3), comes apart from 
the “person-structure” of the statements of the distinctions between the 
Persons of the Trinity, (4) – (6). These scare quotes indicate that there is fur-
ther explaining to do. But we can immediately note that the relationships 
between the Father, Son and Spirit are to be analogous to the relationships 
between the spatial regions that an extended simple occupies, while the 
relationships between each of Father, Son and Spirit and God are to be 
analogous to the relationships between the entities located at the regions 
an extended simple occupies, viz. identity. The “person-structure” and the 
“substance-structure” of the divine are not isomorphic, in much the same 
way that the location structure and mereological structure of extended 
simples are not isomorphic.11
Of course, this claim needs to be spelt out in much more detail. The 
“substance-structure” I am appealing to should be easily comprehen-
sible: it is standard identity. There are numerous questions about identity 
but these are not peculiar to the Trinity: the identity of the Father, Son 
and Spirit with God should be understandable. The real work to do in 
explaining this analogy is to make clear what is meant by the “person-
structure” of the Father, Son and Spirit. In the analogy, this corresponds to 
11I will discuss in more detail below how the “person-structure” and “substance-struc-
ture” of the divine come apart. It’s worth flagging here, though, that although extended 
simples are easily understood on a substantivalist view of space, where space is something 
over and above its occupants, substantivalism is not necessary for extended simples. For 
an anti-substantivalist view of space might still hold that space can be constructed on the 
basis of the best systematisation of distance relations between entities, and on this basis 
some simple entity might be multiply located in space. Such an entity would have distance 
relations to other objects that are inconsistent with its occupying a single point of space. So 
space’s being relational doesn’t entail that the location and mereological structure of entities 
must align. Thanks to David Glick for discussion on this, which was an issue raised by a 
reviewer.
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the complex location of the extended simple or, in other words, the spatial 
regions occupied by the simple entity.
What we need, then, is a notion of “person-space” and of the occupancy 
of this space by entities. I will be thinking of the Persons of the Trinity 
on a model of actual and possible persons: though arguably theologically 
naïve, if we can make sense of the Trinity using these naïve tools then 
there is at least one way to make sense of the doctrine. Furthermore, there 
is no obvious reason why any sophisticated theological use of “Person” 
would make issues for what is to come.
Although our primitive notion of a “space” is derived from the space 
that material objects occupy, we can formalise a number of other spaces 
for other purposes. For instance, in physics the configuration space of 
a system describes all the possible states in which the system can be. In 
other words, it is the range of all the possible configurations of the system. 
A point in the space corresponds to a particular configuration of the en-
tire system. Configuration space is a space with more dimensions that 
the three of physical space, and can have certain mathematical and geo-
metrical properties (including distance relations). A more philosophical 
example is the space of possibility per se.12 Using Lewisian modal realism 
as an explanatory short cut, we can generate a space of possibility by 
taking each point of the space to correspond to a way for the world to be 
(i.e., a possible world). The space of possibility describes how actuality 
might be. For Lewis, distance relations can be defined on this space ac-
cording to relative similarity between worlds.
Importantly, we can choose to introduce spaces as we find them useful. 
As an example, I propose a new notion: taste-space. I can stipulate that 
this is the space that describes all possible tastes. A point in taste-space 
corresponds to a way for something to taste. Tastes that are more similar 
will be closer to each other in this space. It is reasonable to think that 
overall tastes involve the relative amount and balance of more primitive 
tastes like saltiness, sweetness, acidity, spiciness etc. These more primitive 
tastes can therefore provide the axes of this space, allowing distance rela-
tions to be defined on the space. The example of taste-space shows that 
we can describe certain features of the world or of our experiences using 
spatial analogues, with associated benefits of formalisation.
The notion of space, then, seems sufficiently flexible to permit us to 
introduce spaces if they will be useful. I want to introduce a particular 
space I’ll call person-space: the space of possible persons. This space is 
made up of points, and occupying a certain point in person-space is being 
a certain possible person. Distances between points in person-space report 
how alike persons are: these distance relations can be brute or depend on 
certain more primitive axes of similarity. Thus, two entities that are similar 
12Wittgenstein’s discussion in the Tractatus, 1.13 of logical space is an important precursor 
to philosophical use of spatial concepts, and my thanks to Brian Leftow for noting this.
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people will occupy nearer points of person-space than two entities that are 
very different people.
But what is person-space? To begin to answer this, I will first give some 
examples to get a grip on how the concept is supposed to work. So, con-
sider some entities and their occupation of person-space: I occupy exactly 
one point in person-space; Hillary Clinton occupies exactly one point in 
person-space; I do not have a sister, but if I did my sister would occupy 
exactly one point in person-space (cashing out this “would” will connect 
to questions about the existential status of merely possible entities); the 
milk in the fridge occupies no location in person-space as it is not a person.
These are the easy examples, where the points of person-space have at 
most one occupant and the entities occupy at most one point of person-
space. But there are also interesting examples where this seems not to be 
the case. I’ll spend a little while discussing these.
First, imagine a football team on a pitch. Grant that we can consider the 
team as a whole, i.e., as a single thing.13 There is a natural metaphysical 
carving of this whole into eleven parts, namely into the eleven players. 
The team has the mereological structure of having eleven parts. Each of 
these parts occupies a single point in person-space, as each of the players 
is a person. These points are different, of course. I suggest we think of 
the whole team, which is composed of these eleven players, as having 
a location in person-space too. In particular, I propose it is extended in 
person-space by occupying the eleven points of person-space that are the 
locations of its parts.14 The team is spread out in person-space across all 
and only the points that its parts occupy. The football team is therefore an 
example of something occupying multiple points of person-space. In such 
a case, the mereology and person-structure of the team are aligned: there 
is a one-to-one correspondence between the points of person-space the 
team occupies and its parts.
The concept of person-space allows us to describe some more conten-
tious examples too. In the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, it seems that 
there are two people in one body. This can be captured using person-
space: in the story there is one entity occupying two distinct points of 
person-space (using the term “entity” here deliberately avoids the diffi-
cult issue of what exactly is the thing that is two persons). I also want to 
note, tentatively, that this might be an accurate description of some indi-
viduals diagnosed with Dissociative Identity Disorders (previously called 
Multiple Personality Disorders). Perhaps in such circumstances there is a 
13Perhaps it is asking too much to grant that a football team can be considered as a single 
thing. I suspect if one will not grant this, other examples I would appeal to (such as families, 
committees, or bands) will be no more persuasive. Though it will be helpful for my later 
discussion if we already have cases where things are extended in person-space, if these cases 
are not accepted it doesn’t rule out the divine as a sui generis entity with extension in such a 
space.
14This might follow straightforwardly given certain principles governing how and when 
wholes inherit properties of their parts. But I won’t explore this here, as the example is 
simply indicative.
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single entity occupying distinct points of person-space. I do not wish to 
take a stand on these real life cases, though they are suggestive.
The last couple of paragraphs have pointed to cases where it seems that 
things occupy more than one point of person-space. Another interesting 
issue is whether two entities can occupy exactly the same point in person-
space. This is the question of whether two distinct things could both be a 
certain person. Esoteric cases involving clones or time-travellers might be 
examples of this. Suppose, for instance, that Alice time-travels to a point 
in her past. Perhaps the right way to understand this is that at that time 
there are two distinct things (young Alice and old Alice) which are the 
same person. Of course, what to say in such situations is controversial and 
depends on one’s views of the persistence of objects and persons through 
time. But points of person-space being multiply occupied is one alternative.
A different case where we might want multiple occupation of points of 
person-space is qualitative identity. Suppose two entities are qualitatively 
indistinguishable regarding all properties that relate to personhood. Does 
this entail that they occupy the same point of person-space? This is the 
question whether two entities that are exactly similar in this respect are 
in fact the same person.15 No particular answer to the question is needed 
for the notion of person-space I will use. But discussing these questions 
through the lens of person-space highlights them and helps us to see how 
person-space works.
Finally, let me flag another interesting question. Can entities move 
through person-space? We can imagine such a possibility in the fol-
lowing way: suppose that an entity changes which person it is across 
time (for simplicity, in a smooth and continuous way across a fixed axis 
in person-space). In such a case, it seems that the entity would trace a line 
in person-space. Of course, this requires that it is not essential to an entity 
that it is a particular person. Note, though, that if we add a temporal axis 
into person-space so that the points correspond to being a certain person 
at a certain time, every entity that is a person for more than an instant will 
occupy multiple points of person-space.
The discussion of the above strange cases is helpful to get a sense of the 
flexibility of the notion of person-space. There are decisions to make about 
it. Some of these decisions will depend on what we think is possible for 
persons and for entities. I’ve deliberately avoided taking a view on this. 
The use of person-space, however, allows us to tease apart the relevant 
questions.
Another decision, though, is one about which I will specify a prefer-
ence. This concerns the ontological status of person-space. The central 
issue is whether person-space is anything over and above the occupants 
thereof and their properties and relations. In other words, should we be 
15Another way to frame this issue, suggested by a reviewer, is whether the modal facts 
from which the points of person-space are abstracted include “thisness” facts. For what it’s 
worth, I am inclined to view person-space as purely qualitative, and hence permit multiple 
occupation of points of it by entities exactly similar in ways relevant to personhood. 
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substantivalist or anti-substantivalist about person-space? Compare this 
with substantivalist and anti-substantivalist views of space itself: the 
former hold that space and its points are in the fundamental ontology of 
reality while the latter suggest that their existence is merely derivative. 
There are similar issues concerning the ontological status of configura-
tion space and modal space. In each of these three cases, there is ongoing 
and well-documented disagreement.16 Above, I introduced the notion of 
taste-space. It seems much less contentious what the ontological status 
of taste-space is: it is naturally thought of as no more than the possible 
tastes and their relationships. We should be anti-substantivalist about 
taste-space.
I also prefer an anti-substantivalist view of person-space. I take it that 
person-space is nothing over and above the entities occupying it and their 
properties and relations. I prefer this view because I do not wish my use 
of person-space to add to my fundamental ontology. I will therefore be 
using an anti-substantivalist account of person-space in what follows. It is 
open to others, however, to develop my account of the Trinity in line with 
a substantivalist account of person-space.
Given an anti-substantivalist approach to person-space, some more 
metaphysics can be given for person-space. I take person-space to be an ab-
straction of the facts about possible personhood. It is thus a formalisation 
of certain group of modal facts.17 I therefore take it to be merely a way of 
presenting some pre-existing claims: it does not add anything metaphysi-
cally speaking.18 Though it may serve as a clarification and rigidification 
of personhood facts, it does not add to the ontological ingredients of the 
world. Person-space as a whole, which considers all possible persons, 
16For discussion of the ontological priority of configuration space and connected issues, 
see Ney, “Fundamental Physical Ontologies and the Constraint of Empirical Coherence” and 
for discussion of the ontological status of possible worlds the classic text is Lewis, On the 
Plurality of Worlds. 
17If the reader is uncomfortable with modal facts, or indeed facts in general, we can be 
deflationary here: simply insert for “modal facts” whatever it is that does this role in your 
metaphysics.
18The editor, Mark Murphy, has raised the following problem: if person-space is not sub-
stantive, isn’t my argument that follows simply a reformulation of pre-existing claims in the 
doctrine? In other words, if I don’t make any distinctive claims about what it is to be a person 
(i.e., occupy a point of person-space) or posit person-space to be an additional ontological 
ingredient, what more am I saying than that God is Father, Son and Spirit?
 I think this is a good challenge. I have two replies. Firstly, I’m certainly not trying to say 
something that is different to the doctrine, and perhaps not much beyond the doctrine. So 
I’m reasonably happy if the position is a reformulation of that doctrine, albeit hopefully more 
precise in certain ways. Secondly, the reformulation of the doctrine in these terms allows us 
to see the conceptual space between being a certain person and being a certain entity that, 
I think, the doctrine tacitly relies upon. That is, my discussion can show the coherence of the 
pre-existing claims, a coherence that becomes apparent by the reformulation. The reformula-
tion permits distinctions between different structures that were previously obscured. These 
distinctions show how the Trinitarian position is not contradictory in the way outlined in §1.
 Further, the analogy with extended simples suggests that philosophers in other areas 
are willing to countenance very similar moves. So the use of person-space may still be 
dialectically helpful even if, on my deflationary understanding, it doesn’t add content to the 
Trinitarian claims.
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covers all of the range of possibilities for personhood and is thus exhaus-
tive. Points of this space are thus to be thought of as specific possibilities 
for personhood. In particular, a point of person-space is a representation 
of a group of properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for being 
a certain possible person. So a particular point corresponds to a particular 
possible person and distinct points of the space represent distinct possible 
persons. I wish to be deflationary, too, about points of person-space. They 
are not additions to the ontology but structures to describe and formalise 
certain pre-existing specific claims about personhood. Both for person-
space in general and for points of person-space in particular, therefore, 
I do not wish to be committed to anything beyond a formalisation of our 
independently motivated theories what it is to be a person and to be a 
specific person.19
The final issue to address in this section is how persons and person-
space are related. I have said above that the occupation of a point of 
person-space by something is that thing being the corresponding person. 
It is things that are people: the points of person-space correspond to 
the ways that things can be people. Person-space is thus a description 
of the range of possibilities for things in the domain of personhood. We 
might say that person-space is the personal possibilities for things quite 
generally.20 A person, therefore, is something occupying a point of person-
space. When something occupies a point of person-space, it is the relevant 
person. Person-space is the abstract representation of what it is to be all 
actual and possible persons.
This concludes the introduction to person-space. It is a space produced 
from the facts about possible personhood and describes the ways things 
could be persons. Points in person-space are occupied by things, and 
this occupation amounts to that thing being that person. Typically, we 
consider things that occupy just one point of person-space, but we have 
also considered putative cases where the occupation of points of person-
space by entities is more complicated. For instance, the football team and 
Jekyll/Hyde cases might suggest that things can occupy multiple points 
of person-space, while the time-travel case might suggest that points of 
person-space can be occupied by multiple entities. In what follows, I will 
use the notion of person-space and, specifically, its multiple occupation to 
19I wish to flag something here that will be important for later discussion. I take person-
space to be a mechanism for formalising claims about personhood, without adding anything 
ontologically or metaphysically serious. But being deflationary about person-space and its 
points is not being deflationary about the personhood facts. Although person-space is not 
fundamental in the sense that it describes pre-existing claims, this does not mean that those 
claims themselves are not fundamental. By reducing person-space to facts about possible 
persons, I do not mean to reduce the facts about possible persons to anything else. This is 
important for my response to the threat of modalism, and will be mentioned again later in 
the paper.
20This is not to say that any particular thing can occupy any particular point of person-
space: it would seem extremely natural to assert that there are constraints on the range of 
points that particular things might occupy. But person-space gives us the range of possible 
ways that any thing can be a person.
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draw the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity. In doing so I 
attempt to solve the problems the latter faces.
3. The Solution to the Problem
I claim that the divine occupies multiple locations of person-space. More 
precisely, I claim that the single and simple entity that is God is located 
at three distinct points of person-space. Unlike the case of the football 
team above, God does not occupy three distinct points of person-space by 
having as parts three distinct entities occupying those points. Rather, one 
and the same God has a location in person-space three times over. God is 
a simple extended in person-space. Some notation will be helpful here. I’ll 
translate “entity a is person P” as “a occupies point p of personal space.” 
For every P, there is a corresponding p. Thus, I claim that God occupies 
three points of person-space, which we can call f, s, and h. By being at f, 
God is the Father. By being at s, God is the Son. By being at h, God is the 
Holy Spirit. The same entity occupies these three points of person-space, 
so there is only one divine entity. But the distinct points of person-space 
correspond to distinct persons, so there are three divine persons. This al-
lows us to say that there is only one God, but three persons.
This is the central idea. But we now need to show exactly how it solves 
the problem outlined above when introducing the doctrine of the Trinity. 
What would this mean for the statements (1) – (12)? Let us consider them 
in turn.
(1) The Father is God
(2) The Son is God
(3) The Holy Spirit is God
(1) – (3) refer to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit and say of them that they 
are God. Using the notion of personal space introduced above, I gloss 
these as follows:
(1′) The occupant of f is God
(2′) The occupant of s is God
(3′) The occupant of h is God
In other words, the terms “the Father,” “the Son,” and “the Holy Spirit” 
in (1) – (3) I take to refer to the entity occupying the relevant points of per-
sonal space. Thus, following the extended simple analogy, we can say that 
they refer to one and the same entity, namely God. This means that their 
translation into the identity statements below is appropriate:
(7) F = G
(8) S = G
(9) H = G
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F, S, H and G here all denote entities (in fact, they all denote one and the 
same entity). So we can retain (7) – (9) on the interpretation I am offering.
What about the second set of statements derived from the doctrine? 
These are below:
(4) The Father is not the Son
(5) The Father is not the Holy Spirit
(6) The Son is not the Holy Spirit
Now, we know that the entities involved in these statements are all the 
single divine entity. Hence we should not interpret these as the denial of the 
identity claims about entities. In other words, we do not want to accept the 
translation of (4) – (6) into the following claims of numerical distinctness:
(10) F ≠ S
(11) F ≠ H
(12) S ≠ H
But we do want to maintain that the persons of the Trinity are distinct as 
persons. What this means is that there are three points of person-space, 
not one, occupied by the divine entity. Thus, (4) – (6) should be interpreted 
as claims about the structure of the person-space occupied by God, not 
as claims about the structure of the identity relations that hold within the 
Godhead. (4) – (6) should be glossed as:
(4′) f is not s
(5′) f is not h
(6′) s is not h
Of course, all of these are true: these are indeed distinct points in person-
space. But (4′) – (6′), which refer to points of person-space, clearly do not 
entail (10) – (12), which refer to entities. We are not therefore required to 
hold (10) – (12), which generate a contradiction via the transitivity and re-
flexivity of identity. Rather, we can say of the points of person-space:
(10′) f ≠ s
(11′) f ≠ h
(12′) s ≠ h
But, of course, these do not create a contradiction with (7) – (9). This is how 
the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity is supposed to shed 
light on the latter: by distinguishing between the structures of person-
space and entities we can give grounds for the claim that (10) – (12) are not 
the appropriate translations of (4) – (6) and offer alternatives.
The contention of the analogy, therefore, is this: being a certain entity 
and being a certain person are not the same thing, even if that entity is 
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that person. These are conceptually distinct, and so being a certain entity 
and being a certain person are distinguishable. Even if typically entities 
and persons are matched one-to-one, it is conceptually possible that they 
are not. This conceptual possibility is actual in the case of the divine: the 
Persons of the Trinity are the very same entity but there really are three Per-
sons. The analogy with extended simples shows how such structures can 
be distinguished, and the mechanisms by which to express the conceptual 
possibilities involved. God occupies three distinct points of person-space 
but is a single entity. I thus argue that the Latin Trinitarian approach can 
maintain the appropriate sense of the distinctness of the Persons.
4. Responses to Worries
There are a number of worries that might arise from the preceding argu-
ment. Here I want to anticipate some of them.
Modalism
The first concern is the ever-present one for Trinitarian thought that em-
phasises the unity of the Godhead: modalism. Modalism is a view that is 
explicitly ruled out by the doctrinal constraints, so my picture cannot be a 
form of modalism on pain of radical revisionism. I will take modalism to 
be the claim that God’s three-ness is not fundamental. Or, to put it differ-
ently, a modalist view is one that claims that God is Father, Son and Spirit 
only in some derivative sense. In particular, views according to which the 
Persons are not eternal, necessary, or internal to God are modalist. A stan-
dard modalist view is that the Persons are simply different roles God can 
play in relation to us, but any account that takes the Persons to be in any 
way derivative should be counted as modalist.21 Modalism denigrates the 
Persons of the Trinity: it maintains that at the deepest metaphysical and 
theological level, God is not triune.
The view I present is not a version of modalism. This is because God’s 
being the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is fundamental, not derivative. 
God’s being Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is modelled by a single entity 
occupying multiple locations in person-space. The model expresses a fun-
damental fact about the personhood-structure of God. God’s occupancy 
of distinct regions of person-space is a fact at the most primitive meta-
physical and theological level. God is fundamentally, not derivatively, 
three persons.
This is so even on the anti-substantivalist account of person-space that 
I advocate.22 My deflationary approach to person-space states that it is 
nothing over and above the entities that are persons and their proper-
ties and relations. As I described it above, it is a systematisation of the 
facts about possible personhood. Because I am anti-substantivalist about 
21This typical view is probably akin to the views of Sabellius, who was the figure against 
whom responses to modalism were first formulated.
22See also n19.
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person-space, this space is not fundamental. But the facts that it systema-
tises are. The fact that God is the person of the Father is fundamental 
whatever view we have of the ontological status of person-space. Whether 
or not an entity is a particular person is a different question to whether 
or not person-space is anything more that entities and their properties 
and relations. The facts about God’s personhood are fundamental regard-
less of the fundamentality of person-space as an independent item of our 
ontology.
Worries about the fundamentality of God’s three-fold personhood can 
also be assuaged when we notice that the Father is (at least) as much a 
person as I am. The relationship between the entity God and the person 
of the Father is the same as the relationship between the entity that is the 
person I am and the person that I am. The occupancy of the relevant point 
in person-space is not different in any important way between the case of 
the Father (or the Son, or the Holy Spirit) and the case of other persons. 
God the Father is a full person, and fully. The view I am advocating takes 
nothing away from the Father’s personhood. To make this clear, compare 
it with the extended simple case: the simple entity really is located at cer-
tain points of space. Its location at the points it occupies is not derivative, 
nor is it less complete than the location of any other object at the point or 
points it occupies. The extended simple is not in space in a less profound 
sense than anything else is. Likewise, God the Father is not a person in a 
less profound sense than a non-divine person is.
Unpalatable Theological Consequences
Even if the threat of modalism is countered, there are other theological 
issues that can be raised. An important one is that there still seem to be 
worrying statements that come out true on my account and appear to con-
flict with the doctrine. My solution holds that the Father, Son and Spirit 
are, strictly speaking, numerically identical (understanding these terms as 
referring to the entity that occupies the relevant portions of person-space). 
But doesn’t the doctrine require that the Persons are simply numerically 
distinct? My response is that the Persons are distinct, when “the Persons” 
has a certain reference (to points of person-space). But the Persons are also 
not distinct, when this refers to the divine entity. It isn’t clear to me that 
the doctrine and tradition require that the entity that is each Person be 
numerically distinct. If it did, wouldn’t that simply equate to tritheism?
I take the project of philosophical reflection on the Trinity to be to find 
ways to uphold the core of the doctrine without leading to contradiction. 
This might require some accommodation or interpretation of the doctrinal 
claims. I do not wish to dwell on the question of whether the Latin-style 
version of Trinitarianism is theologically acceptable: there is enough to 
read on this question already. But, to put it simply, I don’t accept that 
having numerically distinct entities corresponding to the Persons is a theo-
logical requirement that can be drawn from the core claims outlined in 
§1. God being Father, Son, and Spirit doesn’t entail that there are three 
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divine entities. Those who disagree are unfortunately not going to accept 
the model I here offer of the Trinity, but it is their task to show how the 
core claims lead to numerically distinct entities referred to by the Persons.
However, there may be further statements that my position is com-
mitted to that might be worrying:
(i) “The Father is numerically identical to the Son” is a literal truth 
when “The Father” and “The Son” have the very same referents 
they have in the truths “The Father is God” and “The Son is God.”
(ii) “The Spirit is three persons” is a literal truth when “the Spirit” has 
the very same reference it has in the truth “The Spirit is God.”
I am committed to these statements, and I do think they prima facie sound 
bad. But reflection makes this prima facie impression much weaker. The 
Latin Trinitarian view as I construe it is required to assent to such claims. 
But given the ambiguity involved in the Person-terms and the fact that 
the terms are being deliberately disambiguated in unfamiliar ways in the 
contexts of (i) and (ii), I don’t believe it is unacceptable for these state-
ments to be true. If we substitute “the entity which occupies the point of 
person-space x” for the relevant terms, the resulting claims seem more 
palatable, even though they are equivalent. This indicates that the unusual 
use of the terms in the context might be generating a reasonable amount 
of the discomfort.
In sum, then, I do recognise that some unfamiliar claims will come out 
true on the interpretation I am proposing of the doctrine of the Trinity. But 
these unfamiliar claims are not unacceptable, and do not therefore rule 
out the interpretation.23
Indiscernibility and Identity
If we accept the identities asserted in (7) – (9), then the Father, the Son and 
the Holy Spirit are numerically identical, where these terms refer to the 
entity located at the relevant portions of person-space. But this seems to 
suggest that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit must be indiscernible, for a 
well-established law governing identity is the indiscernibility of identi-
cals: when a = b then a and b share all and only the same properties (and 
relations). This is a problem for the doctrine of the Trinity because the Fa-
ther, Son and Holy Spirit are supposed to share only almost all the same 
properties. In particular, they are supposed to vary in at least the relations 
of origin.24 The Son is begotten by the Father. The Holy Spirit proceeds 
from the Father (Eastern tradition) or the Father and the Son (Western tra-
23My thanks to one of the reviewers for raising the issue tackled in this section, which also 
required revising the scope of the paper, and to Brian Leftow for discussion.
24There are also other properties that seem true of one of the Persons and not another. For 
instance, it could be argued that (while incarnate) the Son doesn’t know everything that the 
Father does. I can’t enter into this debate here. But what I say about the relations of origin 
will generalise, if necessary: I therefore focus on this particular example from here on.
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dition). Thus, it seems that the Father has a property of begetting the Son, 
which neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit do. This appears a violation of 
the indiscernibility of identicals, and hence to prove that the Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit cannot be numerically identical entities after all. To sum up 
the problem: the identity of the occupants of the distinct points of person-
space seems to imply that there can be no variation in qualities across this 
space. But, in fact, the doctrine requires that there is such variation.
Luckily, the analogy with the extended simple case provides help here 
once more. When they were introduced above, I said nothing about the 
properties of extended simples. We might naturally think that extended 
simples have to be qualitatively identical at any location at which they 
exist, i.e., they must be the same across the space they occupy. Interest-
ingly, this is not a constraint that has been readily adopted in the literature. 
In fact, it is a common view that extended simples can be heterogeneous: 
that they can have different properties at the different locations at which 
they exist.25 This causes a problem for the defenders of heterogeneous ex-
tended simples that is parallel to the problem just outlined for the Latin 
Trinitarian: the numerical identity of the occupants of the distinct points 
of physical space seems to imply that there can be no variation in qualities 
across this space.
This problem has been noted and discussed in the case of extended 
simples. A number of different solutions to the problem are available. 
I believe these solutions can be used to give analogous solutions to the 
problem in the case of the Trinity. To argue this, I’ll first focus on one solu-
tion, which I prefer for both problems. But I’ll then briefly indicate how 
we might translate the alternatives from the extended simples literature to 
the context of the Trinity.
My favoured approach in both cases is to appeal to certain sorts of 
properties: fundamental distributional properties. A distributional prop-
erty is a property that grants to its bearer a qualitative variation across 
a particular dimension.26 Typical examples given involve colour: being 
speckled and being polka-dotted, for instance, are colour properties that 
grant variation in colour across space upon their bearers. A speckled hen 
exhibits colour variation across her body by being speckled. A non-colour 
25Those who allow for heterogeneous extended simples include Parsons, “Distributional 
Properties,” Markosian, “Simples, Stuff, and Simple People,” and McDaniel, “Extended 
Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity.” Certain existence monists, who believe that there is 
only one thing and that it is simple, would presumably also subscribe to variation across that 
thing (as does Schaffer in, “From Nihilism to Monism”). Of course, heterogeneous extended 
simples are not without their detractors, e.g., Spencer, “A Tale of Two Simples.”
A prima facie reason to think such variation over space can be argued for is the analogy to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics, where a parallel indiscernibility of identicals challenge is 
raised for objects enduring (i.e., being numerically identical) despite variation over time. But 
I cannot make this argument here and will simply assume the possibility of heterogeneous 
extended simples.
26Parsons, “Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?” and his “Distribu-
tional Properties” introduce these properties.
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example might be turbulence: by being turbulent, a fluid varies in its flow 
across space. There are many further examples of such properties, and 
their existence is not controversial. What is contentious, however, is the 
further claim that some distributional properties are fundamental. That 
is, the claim that some distributional properties are such that they cannot 
be decomposed into any collection of other non-distributional properties. 
If this is so, then there are some properties that simply confer on their 
bearers some qualitative variation in a quality across a dimension, and 
any group of non-distributional properties cannot capture this variation.
Why should we believe that there are fundamentally distributional prop-
erties? I can’t conclusively prove their existence here. But some thoughts 
are suggestive. The best reason to accept fundamental distributional prop-
erties seems to be the difficulty in finding appropriate non-distributional 
properties to capture the distributional ones. For instance, consider the 
speckled hen. If being speckled is not fundamental, there are some non-
distributional properties that jointly capture the speckledness of the hen. 
One might think that these non-distributional properties will be the uni-
form colours of the hen’s body: the patches of brown and white. But these 
patches themselves seem, on closer inspection, to be relevantly similar to 
distributional properties: they are uniform colours spread over a region of 
space. Why is a property that grants uniform colour over a region of space 
less problematic than one that grants a non-uniform colour over a region of 
space? The former seems a special case of the latter: each provides a distri-
bution of a quality over a dimension, but in the former case this distribution 
is less interesting. What we really need for our reduction is properties 
that assign properties to things at points, not regions, of space. But then it 
becomes more difficult to see how things at points of space could be, for 
instance, coloured, or have flow. Fundamentally distributional properties 
therefore become more plausible as the only satisfying account of spread of 
a quality across a region.27
Accepting that there are irreducibly distributional properties gives us 
a solution to the problem of the indiscernibility of identicals for hetero-
geneous extended simples.28 To summarise, the solution is that extended 
simples can have irreducibly distributional properties that imply qualita-
tive variation across space in certain ways. The extended simple is different 
in different places by having a single property of a special kind, and this 
single property cannot be decomposed into non-distributional ones. The 
extended simple has this single property at all locations at which it ex-
ists, so satisfies the indiscernibility of identicals, but the property implies 
27As an aside, we can find some further support for the possibility of fundamentally distri-
butional properties from a couple of sources. Firstly, if spacetime is gunky (i.e., if spacetime 
is infinitely divisible and has no points), all properties of objects located in this spacetime 
will be fundamentally distributional. Secondly, if any properties are emergent in a certain 
way (i.e., don’t supervene on the properties of point-sized objects), these properties will also 
be fundamentally distributional.
28See, again, Parsons, “Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?”
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variation so the extended simple is heterogeneous. Thus, the extended 
simple can exhibit variation across space without violating the indiscern-
ibility of identicals.29 To give an example: suppose an extended simple is 
brown in one region it occupies and white in another. It might seem this 
qualitative variation implies that the thing in the first region is distinct 
from the thing in the second, due to the indiscernibility of identicals. But 
if the extended simple is in fact simply speckled (and irreducibly so), the 
thing in the first region and the second region in fact have one and the 
same property. Therefore, they needn’t be distinct.
We can translate this, via the analogy between extended simples and 
the Trinity, into a solution for the heterogeneity of God across person-
space. I’ll focus on the relations of origin. The Father is begetter and the 
Son is begotten. In our terms, the occupant of the point of person-space 
corresponding to the Father is begetter, and the occupant of the point of 
person-space corresponding to the Son is begotten. This might seem to 
imply that these occupants are distinct entities, through the indiscernibility 
of identicals. But if God in fact simply has an irreducible distributional 
generation property, the occupants of the points of person-space in fact 
have one and the same property. So they needn’t be distinct after all. Thus, 
I claim that there is a single distributional property of generation that the 
single entity that is God has. This property gives God qualitative varia-
tion. The dimension of variation is person-space (just as the dimension of 
variation for an extended simple is space). To repeat: God varies across 
person-space in the property of origination that God displays. But this is 
not a matter of God being different at different parts of person-space: there 
is no property that the entity that the Father is has that the entities that 
the Son or Holy Spirit are do not. For these are all the same entity. Rather, 
this entity, which is the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, has a fundamentally 
distributive property that cannot be reduced to non-distributional ones. 
The seeming qualitative variation of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is 
derived from their joint possession (as a numerically identical entity) of 
a distributive property. The apparent qualitative variation corresponds 
to the qualitative variation encoded by the distributive property across 
person-space. More generally, when the Persons seem to differ, the 
seeming difference is a result of qualitative variation across person-space 
in virtue of some irreducibly distributional property. This means that the 
indiscernibility of identicals is not violated.
29There are, of course, criticisms of the distributional properties solution to the problem 
involving heterogeneous extended simples. McDaniel, “Extended Simples and Qualitative 
Heterogeneity” is a prominent critic. A central worry is that the distributional properties are 
underinformative. The speckled hen, for example, remains speckled regardless of where the 
speckles are on her body. But, McDaniel argues, the different ways for her to be speckled cannot 
be captured if being speckled is a fundamentally distributional property. This issue, while 
important, is not relevant for us. This is because the points of physical space that an extended 
simple occupies are qualitatively identical, and so distributional properties cannot distinguish 
between points of this space. Points of person-space, by contrast, are not qualitatively identical 
and hence a fundamental distributional property across this space can be orientated (see the 
next paragraph). Thanks to a reviewer for encouraging me to think about this.
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A concern can be raised here about the analogy.30 The relations of origin 
seem to encode some sort of priority claim: the Father begets the Son and 
the Spirit proceeds from them jointly (in the Western tradition). It might 
seem that a distributional property cannot capture this priority, for such a 
priority seems to require that the relata of the relation are distinct. There 
are options here. One is to take the relations of origin to be relations be-
tween the points of person-space, rather than belonging to the entity itself. 
As these points are distinct, the relata would be distinct. A second option 
is to say that although God necessarily and eternally occupies the three 
points of person-space, God’s occupation of s is nevertheless in some sense 
dependent upon God’s occupation of f and God’s occupation of h is in 
some sense dependent upon God’s occupation of f and s. This dependence 
between the occupations of the points of person-space is what the rela-
tions of origin are encoding. As all distributional properties grant a certain 
sort of variation across a space on their bearer, the sort of variation in this 
case is simply that of dependence of occupation. The distributional prop-
erty in question makes it the case that one and the same thing occupies the 
different points of person-space with different levels of priority. On this 
second approach, therefore, the relations of origin therefore do not require 
distinct relata.
So, we have discussed how the distributional properties approach can 
solve the indiscernibility of identicals issue for both the heterogeneous 
extended simples and the Trinity. As mentioned, there are alternative ex-
planations are available that ground the claim that extended simples can 
be heterogeneous. Three that are especially worth mentioning are the fol-
lowing: (a) relativizing properties to regions of space, (b) taking extended 
simples and their stuff to be distinct and (c) using localised trope theory. 
I believe that each of these can be translated into appropriate solutions in 
the analogue case of the Trinity, but I cannot fully explore this here. Let 
me, though, at least indicate how I think this would work for these three 
alternatives in turn.
Recall that the problem is how to make sense of extended simples 
exhibiting variation in their qualities over the space they occupy. The rela-
tivisation approach is roughly the following: the heterogeneous extended 
simple bears one property with respect to one region of space and another 
property with respect to another. For instance, an extended simple O is 
hot with respect to one region of space and cold with respect to another. 
The relativiser can maintain this by taking properties themselves to be 
relations to regions of space, or by taking the instantiation of properties 
to be relative to regions of space. This, in turn, can be motivated by refer-
ence to similar temporal relativisation in some endurantist solutions to the 
problem of change.31 How does this translate to the parallel worry about 
30My thanks to Mark Murphy for raising this concern, and offering the first of the solu-
tions I mention.
31See, for instance, Mellor, Real Time, 111–114 and Haslanger, “Endurance and Temporary 
Intrinsics.” The idea is that properties (or the having of properties) are relative to a time, thus 
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variation of the qualities of God across person-space? Well, the Latin Trini-
tarian can take the properties of origin to include relativisation to parts of 
person-space. God is thus “begetter-relative-to-f,” “begotten-relative-to-s,” 
and “proceeding-relative-to-h.” This would be the starting point for an 
explanation of apparent differences in properties between the Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit. It is worth noting, though, that such relativizing might be 
dependent on a substantivalist understanding of person-space, rather than 
the deflationary view I adopted above.32
The second approach, advocated by Markosian, involves making a 
distinction between things and stuff and, in particular, between an object 
and the stuff of which it is made.33 An extended simple, on this view, is a 
simple object but is constituted by certain matter. This matter is not simple, 
but rather has parts. The bearer of the properties which vary across space, 
for Markosian, are the portions of stuff, rather than the extended simple. 
Because these portions are distinct from one another, the indiscernibility 
of identicals worry can’t get off the ground. The central move, then, in 
Markosian’s solution is to identify the bearers of the properties as stuff, 
not things.
Translating this into the Trinitarian case is more complicated than in 
the other solutions, and I am more tentative about its success. But the cen-
tral move, again, is to identify the bearers of the properties of origin as 
distinct from the entity that is God. One candidate is the points of person-
space themselves, a possibility mentioned above.34 Because the points of 
person-space are distinct, if they are the bearers of the varying properties 
then no problem from the indiscernibility of identicals arises. Again, as 
in the previous solution, an approach along these lines might be more 
conducive to a Latin Trinitarian who took a more ontologically robust 
view of the points of person-space that I have done in this paper.35 This 
is because Markosian explicitly relies on an ontology that doesn’t reduce 
things to stuff or vice versa (called the “Mixed Ontology”). The parallel 
avoiding the charge that when an object changes one and the same thing has incompatible 
properties.
32Thanks to a reviewer for pointing this out. The issue is that substantivalism about time 
and space makes much more plausible the relativisation to them posited by certain enduran-
tist and extended simple solutions respectively (argument to this effect in the endurance case 
can be found in Ted Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, 113 ff. I don’t find this totally convincing, but 
here is not the place to say why (though see also n11 above). My own views on endurance 
and change, at least, do not require this (see Pickup, “A Situationalist Solution to the Ship of 
Theseus Puzzle” for some indicative material). At any rate, the pairing of a substantivalist 
view of person-space with relativisation to that space is not something I am ruling out. As I 
have said, though, I prefer the pairing of anti-substantivalism about person-space and fun-
damental distributional properties (which do not require relativisation).
33See Markosian, “Simples, Stuff, and Simple People,” which spells out further some 
thoughts from his “Simples.”
34Another option is to take God to be in some sense composed of divine “matter,” distinct 
from the divine thing. This matter would be complex, with exactly three parts (corresponding 
to the Persons). This is suggestive but not something I’ll investigate here.
35See §2 above.
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here would be the irreducibility of points of person-space to entities (and 
vice versa).
However, there’s still more work to do before a Markosian-style solu-
tion to the Trinitarian case is established. In the extended simple case, 
there is a relation of constitution between the stuff and the things. What is 
the parallel relation for the Trinity? Not constitution, as the divine is not 
constituted by points of person-space. Perhaps it is simply the occupation 
relation. But it’s not at all obvious how the occupation relation would do 
the required job. So more work would need to be done to develop such a 
Markosian-style account. I will therefore only tentatively propose that a 
solution along these lines is worth investigating further.
The third alternative is to take the properties that are ascribed to the 
extended simple as tropes of a specific sort. Tropes are particulars, rather 
than universals, and give certain qualities to their bearers. The claim of 
this solution is that an extended simple has localised tropes: O has both 
the “hot at s” trope and the “cold at s*” trope.36 These tropes do not re-
semble, but they are not contradictory either. So the extended simple 
displays the variation by having non-resembling localised tropes that are 
local to the different parts of space that it occupies. (One might wonder 
about a connection to the first, relativizing approach here.) Similarly, the 
Trinitarian can make use of tropes with circumscribed locations in person-
space. For instance, the relations of origin can be taken to be tropes that are 
local within this space: God has both the local-to-point-of-person-space-f 
begetter trope and the non-resembling local-to-point-of-person-space-s 
begotten trope. As tropes which are local to those points of person-space, 
these can be jointly held by a single thing, so the indiscernibility of iden-
ticals is not violated.
I have explicitly not investigated these candidate solutions in detail, 
either as applied to heterogeneous extended simples or to the Trinity. But I 
hope to have indicated how work in the literature in the former case carry 
over to the latter. Thus, the defence of the Latin Trinity against the indis-
cernibility of identicals worry is heavily indebted to discussion of how 
to accommodate variation in the extended simples literature. Although 
I prefer the distributional properties view, if any such explanation is co-
herent then there may be a translation into the Trinitarian case.37 I conclude 
that we have the resources to avoid the charge that the numerical identity 
account proposed fails to capture the relations of origin that obtain within 
the Godhead.
The Metaphysical Status of the Persons
There is a fourth worry that might follow from the above discussion. 
The appeal to distributional properties might make us concerned about 
36This is how McDaniel, “Extended Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity” develops the 
solution. It draws on a similar solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics outlined by 
Ehring, “Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics, and Momentary Tropes.”
37As noted above, it would take further work to establish this for Markosian’s solution.
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the status of the Persons of the Trinity. I’ll show this worry via extended 
simples.
Imagine an extended simple rod, R.38 Imagine, further, that R is red in 
one continuous half of the spatial region it occupies and blue in the other 
continuous half of the spatial region it occupies. The concern in the last 
section was that it seems as though what is located at one half of the spa-
tial region and what is located at the other half have different properties. 
But if R is an extended simple then there is just one entity located at these 
regions, which cannot have different properties from itself. To resolve this 
initial issue, we say that R has a single, irreducibly distributional property 
of being red-and-blue-in-the-appropriate-ways. Contrast this description 
of the extended simple case with what is happening in a normal case. Nor-
mally, we would say that R has a red half and a blue half. But we are not 
allowed to say this in the extended simple case as R is a simple. Speaking 
with metaphysical rigour, therefore, there is no such thing as a half of R. 
What there is, instead, is a region of space at which R is located which is 
where R is red.
Now we turn to the Trinity. The Son is begotten. What does this mean, 
in metaphysical rigour? It does not mean that there is an entity that is the 
Son, and that this entity is begotten simpliciter. For the entity occupying 
the relevant person-space is God, who is not begotten simpliciter. Rather, 
it means that there is a region of person-space such that it is occupied 
by God and God is begotten there. God has the irreducible distributional 
property of divine origin, and the way God has this heterogeneous prop-
erty in the region of person-space corresponding to the second Person is 
what it is for the second Person to be begotten. But, much as we cannot 
in metaphysical rigour talk of the red half of R, we cannot speak of the 
Son part of God. In metaphysical rigour, we can talk of the occupant of 
a point of person-space ( = God), and also of a point of person-space. We 
have the entity, God, and the three points of person-space God occupies, f, 
s and h. A single entity is each of the Persons of the Trinity. But in talking 
of the distinctness of the Persons, we are not speaking of their numerical 
distinctness. Rather, we are referring to the points of person-space so oc-
cupied by God. The lesson from this is that the terms “Father,” “Son,” and 
“Spirit” (and their cognates) refer to God when speaking of an entity, but 
can also be used to refer to different categories of thing, namely points of 
person-space. God belongs to the category of entities. Points in person-
space, by contrast, are not entities. This may be unpalatable to some: they 
may be disconcerted that we can, using the term “Father,” refer not to an 
entity but to a way of being a person. This, I take it, is a cost of the theory.
Necessary Co-extension of Persons and Entities
A fifth worry is connected to this, and denies that there is such a distinc-
tion between persons and entities. A disputant might argue as follows:
38I am grateful to Dani Kodaj for this example, and the point it makes.
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It is clear that persons and entity are numerically identical. When I 
talk about Hillary Clinton, I am talking about the entity that is Hillary 
Clinton and the person Hillary Clinton: they are one and the same 
thing. One way to characterise this is to assert that persons are a sub-
category of entities (as are, e.g., animals, artefacts, subatomic particles 
and planets). But I don’t even need this assertion; I merely need it to be 
the case that persons and entities cannot be separated. So the notion of 
person-space is otiose: it is exactly isomorphic to a sub-region of the 
space generated by assigning each entity a point.
The disputant is right that I need this distinction between persons and 
entities, for I claim that in the Trinity there is only one entity, but three 
persons. Hence I take it that counting by entities and counting by persons 
are different, and, more importantly, that what it is to be a particular entity 
is not the same as what it is to be a particular person.39 But I don’t think 
that the disputant’s position is as obvious as it is presented. Though I have 
made my task deliberately difficult by using a notion of personhood that 
is generic, it worth remembering that the doctrinal texts do not force us to 
hold that the “Persons” need satisfy philosophical analyses of the contem-
porary notion of personhood. Thus even if “persons” in the contemporary 
usage implies identity of entity, it may not in the theological usage.
But more ambitiously, I think the putative possible cases like that of 
Jekyll and Hyde might make us doubt the identity claim even in the case 
of human persons. Given that what I am seeking to do is make a conceptual 
distinction between person-structure and entity-structure, to rule this out 
the disputant needs to not only show that persons and entities are related 
one-to-one in actuality, but that they must be. In other words, not only that 
person-space and a region of entity-space are isomorphic when consid-
ering actual persons and entities, but also when considering all possible 
persons and entities. The onus, I feel, is on the disputant to establish this. 
Presumably establishing this would be done by giving an account of per-
sonhood (and, indeed, of entities), the satisfactory completion of which 
would be no mean feat.
Lack of Novelty
Finally, even a sympathetic reader may worry that what I am presenting 
here is no real advance in our understanding, as it adds nothing to the 
Latin Trinitarian approach spelt out in detail by Brian Leftow in various 
places. In response, I’d like to point to a few things I think this analogy does 
add, but first it is worth a brief sketch of Leftow’s view in order to make 
the relevant contrasts clear.
39If counting by persons and counting by entities gives different results, this might seem 
to suggest my solution is a variant of a relative identity view. But this isn’t actually so. If I 
see three of the same brand of car, counting by cars and counting by brands of car will give 
different results. This doesn’t require relative identity, but just that cars and brands of car are 
not in a one-to-one correspondence. Thanks to Mark Murphy for highlighting this possible 
concern. 
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Leftow presents an account of the Trinity that belongs in the same cat-
egory as that defended in this paper: a Latin approach. That is, his view is 
one that maintains the strict identity of the Persons with God and there-
fore has the task of explaining what the distinctions between the Persons 
consists in. For Leftow, God is just one thing but has three distinguishable 
“life streams”: these are what correspond to the Persons. So there is a life 
of the Father, a life of the Son and a life of the Spirit: these are distinct 
lives and contain distinct conscious events but all belong to a single en-
tity. A parallel Leftow draws is with an imagined case of time-travel: the 
time-traveller might be simultaneously living different parts of the life 
of a single thing. Similarly, the Father, Son and Spirit are all numerically 
identical to God, but God’s life has the curious form that it is composed 
of three simultaneous strands. Unlike in the time-travel case, God’s life 
strands are not sequential.
Thus, Leftow’s account has significant connections to the one I present 
here. However, as mentioned, I believe there to be some key differences. 
In order of increasing importance, they are:
a) At the very least, the analogy with extended simples offers a dif-
ferent way to approach the Latin Trinitarian theory. The analogy 
with extended simples is a helpful one, in that it clarifies the dis-
tinction between the entity that is located at points of person-space 
and the points of person-space themselves. The parallel with the 
separation of the mereological and spacetime location structure of 
extended simples helps to warrant such a distinction.
b) Leftow’s account of the Trinity takes the Persons’ identities to be 
event-based: it is the events of their lives that individuate and dis-
tinguish the Persons.40 My approach is more flexible: it is neutral on 
what the Persons of the Trinity are and how they are to be charac-
terised. These will depend on the precise character of personhood 
(and hence of person-space). By occupying a point of person-space, 
entities are particular persons. Thus, entities are the things that are 
people, but counting by entities and counting by persons can give 
different results. But this leaves open both the metaphysical cat-
egory to which persons belong and the means of characterising 
persons. It therefore doesn’t require that the Persons of the Trin-
ity are understood as event-based (though they can be understood 
in this way). My account is thus more general than Leftow’s, and 
allows the Trinitarian more resources for answering the difficult 
question of what the Persons are. Leftow’s original account may be 
easily adaptable to accommodate wider possibilities, but here it is 
explicit that a Latin Trinitarian approach doesn’t entail an event-
based view of the identity of the Persons.
40Leftow, “A Latin Trinity,” 315. 
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c) Thirdly, the approach doesn’t require the metaphysical (or concep-
tual) possibility of time-travel. (Perhaps Leftow’s doesn’t either.41) 
So if you’re uncomfortable with time-travel, you might still accept 
the analogy offered here. On the other hand, of course, extended 
simples are controversial, so perhaps some are more inclined to 
accept the possibility of time-travel than of extended simples. At 
any rate, a second, logically independent analogy bolsters the case. 
Furthermore, the central work done by Leftow’s time-travel anal-
ogy is to give us a case of multilocation: multilocation provides the 
conceptual grip on the Latin Trinity he advocates. While extended 
simple cases can be thought of as instances of multilocation (where 
the object is fully located at each of the points of space it can be 
found), they do not have to be. For instance, extended simples could 
be only partially located at each of the points of space where they 
can be found, and fully located only at the combination of these.42 
Similarly, although the above has been tacitly framed in terms of 
multilocation, God could be located at the relevant three points of 
person-space only partially, and fully located only at their sum. I 
myself do not favour this view, but it shows the independence of 
the Latin Trinitarian approach from the possibility of multilocation. 
What matters, rather, is the different structures of entities and per-
son-space. The account here presented therefore does not, unlike 
Leftow’s, rely on multilocation.
d) Finally, the extended simples literature gives us a series of neat 
options for solving the problem of the indiscernibility of identi-
cals and the different relations of origin within the Godhead for a 
view that asserts the numerical identity of God with Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit. These options correspond to the solutions to the 
parallel problem of heterogeneous extended simples. I’ve outlined 
the position I find most appealing, namely irreducible distributive 
properties, but it is a major benefit to the Latin approach that there 
are these further metaphysical resources already developed that 
can be explored.
5. Conclusion
I have here presented an analogy between extended simples and the 
Trinity, more specifically between the way that extended simples occupy 
space and the way that God is distinct persons. The analogy relies on a 
notion of “person-space.” I believe this analogy strengthens the Latin 
Trinitarian approach by showing the distinction between entity- and 
person-structure, and hence the possibility of these coming apart in the 
divine. The analogy helps to show how a Latin Trinity can maintain both 
41See Leftow, “A Latin Trinity,” 309–311 for discussion.
42For this “spanner” approach see, e.g., McDaniel, “Extended Simples.”
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the numerical identity of God with the Persons (understood as occupants 
of person-space) and the numerical distinctness of the Persons (under-
stood as locations in person-space). It might also give pause to those who 
are willing to take extended simples metaphysically seriously but are not 
willing to do the same in the case of the Trinity.43
New College, Oxford
References
Cross, Richard. 2009. “Latin Trinitarianism: Some Conceptual and Historical 
Considerations.” In Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity, edited by 
Thomas McCall and Michael Rea (Oxford University Press), 201–213.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216215.003.0011
Ehring, Doug. 1997. “Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics, and Momentary Tropes.” Anal-
ysis 57: 254–258. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8284.00084
Hasker, William. 2013. Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God (Oxford University 
Press). doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199681518.001.0001
Haslanger, Sally. 1989. “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.” Analysis 49: 119–
125. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/49.3.119
Howard-Snyder, Daniel. 2015. “Trinity.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Routledge). doi: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-K105-2
Kleinschmidt, Shieva. 2012. “Many-One Identity and the Trinity.” In Oxford Studies 
in the Philosophy of Religion 4: 84–96. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.003.0005
Leftow, Brian. 2004. “A Latin Trinity.” Faith and Philosophy 21: 304–333. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil200421328
Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds (Blackwell).
Markosian, Ned. 1998. “Simples.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 213–226. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409812348361
Markosian, Ned. 2004. “Simples, Stuff, and Simple People.” The Monist 87: 405–428. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.5840/monist200487318
McCall, Thomas, and Michael Rea, eds. 2009. Philosophical and Theological Essays on 
the Trinity (Oxford University Press).
McDaniel, Kris. 2007. “Extended Simples.” Philosophical Studies 133: 131–141. 
doi: https://doi.org/0.1007/s11098-006-9010-y
McDaniel, Kris. 2009. “Extended Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity.” The 
Philosophical Quarterly 59: 325–331. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.589.x
Mellor, Hugh. 1981. Real Time (Cambridge University Press).
43This paper has greatly benefitted from the input of a number of people, including Mark 
Murphy, two referees for this journal, Brian Leftow, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, and my 
colleagues on The Metaphysics of Entanglement project based in the Faculty of Philosophy, 
Oxford University. I am grateful to them all, and to the funder of our project, the Templeton 
World Charity Foundation, which supported this research.
440 Faith and Philosophy
Ney, Alyssa. 2015. “Fundamental Physical Ontologies and the Constraint of 
Empirical Coherence: A Defense of Wave Function Realism.” Synthese 192: 
3105–3124. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0633-9
Parsons, Josh. 2000. “Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?” The 
Monist 83: 399–418. doi: https://doi.org/10.5840/monist200083319
Parsons, Josh. 2004. “Distributional Properties.” In Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy 
of David K Lewis, edited by Frank Jackson and Graham Priest (Oxford Univer-
sity Press), 173–180.
Pickup, Martin. 2016. “A Situationalist Solution to the Ship of Theseus Puzzle.” 
Erkenntnis 18: 973–992. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9777-3
Rea, Michael. 2003. “Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity.” Philosophia 
Christi 5: 431–445.
Rea, Michael. 2009. “The Trinity.” In The Handbook of Philosophical Theology, edited 
by Thomas Flint and Michael Rea (Oxford University Press), 403–429.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199289202.003.0019
Saucedo, R. 2011. “Parthood and Location.” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6: 225–
286.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007. “From Nihilism to Monism.” Australasian Journal of Phi-
losophy 85: 175–191. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400701343150
Sider, Ted. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism (Oxford University Press).
doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/019924443X.001.0001
Spencer, Joshua. 2010. “A Tale of Two Simples.” Philosophical Studies 148: 167–181. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9291-4
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974 (revised edition). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans-
lated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul).
